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Introduction
Recently we have seen a tremendous growth in the use of electronic brokerages (e-brokerages) for on-line investing (Fortune
1998; Gomez et al., 1996). The number of e-brokerages has increased from 12 in 1994 to over 60 today. These e-brokerages
claim to have timely order execution and guaranteed execution prices at a very low cost to the investor. The low cost is a result
of electronic processes replacing expensive human processes. It is, however, not clear what percentage of cost savings is a result
of the automation of the order-taking process. E-brokerages may be relying on the perceptions and beliefs of the investor
regarding the causality between automation, rapid transaction execution, and expected results. However, the process of trading
may not be transparent enough to the investors. They cannot be sure that they are getting the best deal and yet, are willing to pay
a commission to the e-brokerage for mediating in the trading process. This value that the investor attaches to the e-brokerage
services has to be studied and contrasted with traditional brokerages. As a first step towards this goal, we attempt to determine
the correlation between commissions, timeliness and best deals for the investor using some empirical data. We use extant theories
from economics, specifically from transaction cost economics, to provide some insights into the impact and use of electronic
brokerages. In the next section, we provide the research expectations and hypotheses. The third section contains the results
derived from preliminary empirical data and a discussion of these findings in view of the research expectations.

The Brokerage Service
The traditional process of financial trading is described in Figure 1 that is self-explanatory. When a trade is executed, the
“filled order” is printed by the exchange and the brokerage house alerts the customer. This process can take as long as 5 minutes
or so. There are chances for errors by the phone- clerk and time is wasted as the order is walked to the trading pit. There are
many ways to improve this process. Online trading attempts to do so with the claims of lowering transaction costs.
Approximately half of the services offered are really no improvement over the traditional process. We found that nearly
all firms process the incoming order very similar to the traditional process. The difference is that instead of the order being
transmitted over the phone, it is transmitted via the Internet. Once the order is received at the e-broker, a manager checks the
order and routes it depending on the class, price, size, etc. More than half the firms route these orders to an exchange, such as
the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, where the trade takes place much like a traditional order is traded {see Figure 1}. This process
brings up many questions. The firms claim that the order checking process takes no more than 10 seconds. If this is so, we must
wonder what type of checking can be done in ten seconds, and if it is that easy, why checking is not built into the system? It
would seem that an automated process could easily replace any type of checking, such as margin approval or type of trade
approval, saving both time and money. Also, during high volume trading, an automated system would be extremely beneficial.
There does not seem to be very large savings in time or resources using “online trading.”
Furthermore, we were
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firms claim that the whole process takes no more than three minutes, often less than one and a half minutes. They guarantee
exchange prices, but exchange prices at which time of the process - Is it the time the order is received at the e-brokers, the time
it is sent to the third party, or the time the third party receives the order? Most exchanges update quotes at least every fifteen
seconds, and with the clock ticking, opportunities are lost. When time is critical in a trade and timeliness in executing an order
a must, the individual investor needs to ask these questions.
Individual Investor

E-Broker

Third Party

Research Expectations and
Hypotheses

As explained above, brokerage services
are perceived to be value-adding services to
the process of trading. The addition of value
can be understood by applying theories from transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985; Malone 1989). The formal definition
of TCE applicable to organizational governance structure has to be suitably adapted to the context of e-brokerages. An ebrokerage will choose to use or not use other intermediaries (e.g., third-party) and/or a price structure for services depending
on the transaction costs incurred by the firm for providing the services electronically, and also based on the transaction costs
perceived by the investor. The concept of transaction costs, in terms of co-ordination cost and production cost, can be enumerated
for each party in the trading process. We focus only on the transaction costs for the e-brokerage in this paper. Since the electronic
trading process is mainly an information processing and negotiating activity, we also assume that the transaction costs consist
entirely of co-ordination costs with negligible production costs. We also extend the elements of transaction costs to include the
quality claimed by the e-brokerage as a determinant of the transaction costs. That is,
Transaction costs = f(quality, co-ordination costs).
The reason for using the quality of service, which is an attribute of the final product, in the transaction costs equation will
be clear from the following explanation of what quality is in the context of e-brokerage. The quality of service operationalizes
the inherent risk of undertaking a transaction in a time-critical activity such as trading. Greater the timeliness in executing the
trading, the lesser is the difference from the firms’expected returns (since by guaranteeing exchange prices, the firm bears a risk),
and hence, higher is the quality. Since quality makes a difference to the expected returns, it enters the cost equation of decisionmakers as the cost of risk. Rather than using robust statistical analyses, we first try to operationalize some key concepts of the
transaction cost economics in the information technology and brokerages services context, and then, use available empirical data
to find simple evidence for some preliminary hypotheses. With this in mind, we state the following set of hypotheses as our main
expectations regarding electronic brokerages that can be generalized to situations where information technology aids in the
intermediating process:
1. E-brokers will charge a higher fee for more timely transactions because timely transactions lead to better prices for investors.
Figure 2. Third-party Trading
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3.

E-brokers obtain timeliness of transactions by trading at the exchanges and eliminating intermediaries. This also lowers coordination costs.
The commission reflects the value (in terms of lower investor transaction costs) that the investor places on timeliness and
quality, and is not affected by the co-ordination costs faced by e-brokers (corollary to 2).

Data Collection
As a pilot study, we contacted 40 brokerage firms and conducted interviews and obtained data from their web sites regarding
prices of their services. Specifically, we determined the brokerage fees, average time to execution (timeliness), the number of
e-brokerages trading on exchanges, and the number trading with third parties (Please see Table 1). The brokerage fee figures
are based on the cost to execute a market order for a minimum of 1000 shares. The timeliness is the firm’s own printed or quoted
times (or delays) for the trade to be completed. The brokerage fees variable measures the pricing structure of transactions and
hence the transaction costs also. The timeliness measures the quality of the transaction. The distribution of trading between the
firm and the Exchange and between the firm and third parties is an indicator of importance of co-ordination costs of transactions
and quality. If a firm chooses higher percentage of trading with the Exchange (and a lower percentage of trading with third
parties transactions, hence indicating a preference to eliminate intermediaries), the transactions in that firm have a higher coordination cost. The results presented in the next section are based on these operationalizations of key terms from transaction
cost economics.

Results and Discussion
A preliminary investigation and categorization of the results are tabulated in Table 1. We have not resorted to robust
statistical investigation, since this was an attempt to operationalize some sticky concepts in transaction cost economics in the
e-brokerage context. We found that e-brokerages charge a higher fee for timeliness suggesting that higher quality signals the
investor to perceive lower transaction costs. These e-brokers are electronically connected to their broker representatives at the
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Table 1. Brokerage Fees and Execution Time
# of Average Claimed Execution
# Trading on
Firms
Time
Exchange*
Less than $8.95
3
3 minutes
0
$8.96 - $13.95
5
2.6 minutes
2
$13.96 - $18.95
9
2.56 minutes
8
$18.96 - $23.95
12
1.75 minutes
10
greater than $23.95
7
1.14 minutes
4
*Some e-brokers send orders to either exchanges or third parties
Brokerage Fees

# Trading with Third
Parties*
3
5
5
4
7

exchanges, thereby able to get the best prices for the consumers at the earliest. This is contrary to trading with third parties that
have a much higher bid-ask spreads and free ride on exchange prices. E-brokerages who trade with third parties offset their
reduced direct revenues from customers by receiving part of the spread from the third parties (Fortune 1998). We also found
support for the second hypothesis that as timeliness increases, the percentage of trading on Exchange increases suggesting the
importance of lower co-ordination costs. However, this pattern does not continue indefinitely. For we find that a large percentage
of firms with the highest timeliness (1.25 minutes), traded with third parties than the categories of firms with an average
timeliness of 1.64 and 2.57 minutes. This seems to indicate a pattern for the relationship between quality and co-ordination costs.
The pricing behavior, which may be conjectured as determined by transaction costs, is dictated to a large extent by the quality
of the transaction. The distribution of volume of trading between exchange and third party is an indicator of the importance of
transaction costs and quality. We expect that all firms charging high commission will trade directly with exchanges. But we
found that a high percentage of these firms use third-parties. The high commission charged by these firms is not necessarily for
the timeliness, but also for factors such as research and service quality, which investors value and are willing to pay for. These
firms also seem to provide better cues and signals to indicate their high quality to investors. We plan to explore these issues in
future research by proposing a more rigorous model for transaction costs and its constituents and by collecting more data
(Konana et al 1998). Contrary to the expectations that the role of intermediaries will decline with electronic markets, another
stronger intermediary (i.e., third-parties or market-makers) is growing and so the electronic brokering process has to be studied
in greater detail.
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